Stephen Pinker’s diatribe (an appropriate word, I think) has prompted a fair number of responses from some pretty intelligent folks around the blogosphere.

The assumption implicit in my question about Pinker’s reading of Leon Kass is that he fundamentally misunderstands Kass’s hermeneutic and philosophical style. My brother, rightly, wondered what had prompted that thought in me.

I was going to answer him, but then I read Darwinian Conservative Larry Arnhart’s take, who pointed out exactly what I would have:

Here’s an example. Pinker writes that in the report, many of the authors “assert that the Old Testament is the only grounds for morality (for example, the article by Kass claims that respect for human life is rooted in Genesis 9:6, in which God instructs the survivors of his Flood in the code of vendetta: ‘Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God was man made.’”

Now, if one actually reads Kass’s contribution to this report, which can be found here, one sees the following passage that Pinker is citing: “Human life is to be respected more than animal life–Why?–because man is more than an animal; man is said to be god-like. Please note that the truth of the Bible’s assertion does not rest on biblical authority.” Notice that Pinker ignores Kass’s disclaimer that the truth of this assertion does not depend on biblical authority alone–in contrast to Pinker’s claim that the authors of the report are asserting “that the Old Testament is the only grounds of morality.”

There is a serious point here. In Kass’s book on Genesis, and in some of his other writings, Kass does sometimes suggest that the Bible might provide a moral teaching that goes beyond secular reasoning. But Kass is rather evasive about this. And Pinker has no interest in probing into the complexity of Kass’s writing. All that Pinker cares about is condemning Kass as a conspirator in promoting theocracy in America.

After reading Pinker’s essay, I was pretty confident he had badly misread Leon Kass. I didn’t think, though, that he may not have read the collection essays he was writing about. But among those who have read the essays, that is very much a possibility.

In honor of Matt’s thought-provoking post last week (how could it be otherwise, with needling statements like, “Husbands and Wives Can’t be Friends!” or eye-stopping suggestions that singles would “do better (oddly) to cultivate friendships with their same sex while viewing the opposite sex through a strictly romantic lens.”), I thought I’d highlight another discussion touching on divorce and marriage.

Chesterton once said that, “The obvious effect of frivolous divorce will be frivolous marriage. If people can be separated for no reason they will feel it all the easier to be united for no reason.” While the Cherub sounds, as usual, witty and insightful in his assertion I was pleasantly surprised by the perceptive—albeit slightly cryptic—response of one of Mere Orthodoxy’s readers who suggested that Chesterton had things backwards. The comment, “Ah, but my dear fellow … the problem is that they have reasons. And this is exactly what blinds them”, re-ignited some of my own thoughts in the same direction and, conveniently, since this particular reader felt no obligation or inclination to elucidate his short reply, I’ve taken the liberty to do so on his behalf.

The current emphasis on compatibility and “finding the right match for you” in relationship counsel underscores the present obsession with having reasons, and lots of them, for marrying a particular person. The usual reasons for marrying tend to be those sorts of things that sound good, noble, and even prudent but are not sustainable, cannot be guaranteed to continue over time, and were never meant to be the foundation for a enduring covenant between two individuals. While it might be important on some level to discover that your potential mate shares your values, fits with your idea of the good life, and even loves B-horror flicks from the 80’s as much as you do, these (or any other of E-Harmony’s 29 dimensions of compatibility) cannot provide a foundation sufficient to bear the weight of a permanent covenant.

The problem with basing marriage on compatibility is that those things that make two people compatible today might easily change over time—and they usually do (who really expects, or wants, to be the same person they are today, ten years from now?). We all assume that we will change, grow up, and grow old and there is a good possibility that our current self-concept will not bear a significant resemblance to who we become.

Founding an enduring commitment on changeable properties is almost certain to end in something other than either endurance or commitment. An enduring commitment must be founded on something that is enduring and unchangeable itself—something like Love or Duty or God. My sympathies lie with the latter (especially if the God in questions is Love and is the Being whose existence grounds obligation and Duty), as the pagan Love and Duty turn out to cause other relational problems, but for the sake of the present argument any of the three will do.

An emphasis on compatibility provides little room for the freedom necessary for love to develop. A constant fear hangs over the heads of the perfectly compatible couple that, should one ever-so-slightly adjust himself, their entirely harmonious relationship might admit a speck of dirt that could bring the well-oiled mechanism of relatedness to a jarring, grinding halt. If he loves her because she’s intelligent, she will always be afraid to reveal the parts of herself that appear silly, foolish, or plainly stupid. If she loves him for his wit, the inevitable day when no jest arises will loom over him with a nearly paralyzing force.

The happily incompatible couple is free from such dread and free to get on with the task that every couple must face if their relationship is to endure—the task of learning to love. To be united for “no reason” is hardly frivolous, it just might be the way to save marriage from the crushing impossibility of being compatible and while liberating men and women to live with a “perfect love [that] casts out fear.”

Alfred North Whitehead once said, “Everything of importance has been said before by someone who did not discover it.”
How do I know?

I know Whitehead said this because J. Samuel Preus quotes him in an article about Spinoza. That’s not quite right, though: Preus doesn’t quote Whitehead, but quotes a quotation from Whitehead in a book by Robert Merton. And now here I am quoting a quotation of a quotation of a quotation (I think that covers it, but I’m dizzy).

Kinda confirms Whitehead’s point, which he probably learned from someone else anyway.

Yup. And I now know it because Leithart quoted a quotation of a quotation of a quotation. I won’t even say what that makes this post.

(Come on now, someone keep the party going!!!)

At some point, we’re going to get tired of commentary and start reading primary sources again. It’s inevitable.

(Hasty posting does not a good blogger make.  Post updated to clear up an idiotic confusion.

In this month’s issue of The New Republic, Steven Pinker critiques Leon Kass and the concept of ‘human dignity’ as a basis to bioethics. While the article lacks the footnotes that would give it the additional credibility it needs to offset Pinker’s invective against his opponents, it is still an interesting challenge to the idea that ‘human dignity’ should function as a limiter in bioethics.

My question: is it possible that Pinker’s empirically-oriented mindset prohibits him from understanding Kass’ style of argumentation?

Read the whole thing, then discuss.  I’m curious to hear our brilliant readers’ opinions on this one.

Donald Miller of Blue Like Jazz fame gave the world a baptized version of Jack Kerouac’s storyized ramblings. Now, Christian George has given us a more orthodox exploration of life as a Christian in the 21st age in his creatively titled, Sex, Sushi and Salvation.

George is a sharp guy, and clearly a capable theologian. He builds his book on the premise that because humans are made in the image of God, we long for intimacy, community, and eternity. The stories that he tells are always engaging and often illuminating.

George’s book functions as a youthful conservative response to a more liberalized Christianity. George registers concerns about “doctrine-resistant” emergent church proponents and others who have fallen sway to post-modern ideologies. George seems to be attempting to take the best story-telling aspects of post-modern adherents and weaving them into a conservative theological framework that is grounded, above all, in an authentic experience of the Living God.

There is much to be gained from this project, and George pulls it off well. Perhaps I am not nearly as in-tune with my generation, but much like Miller’s book, I found the disjointed nature of the stories confusing and off-putting. There is some question, I think, whether Miller’s style can be baptized effectively, or whether it is itself at odds with a conservative theological position.

Sex, Sushi and Salvation, however, is a compelling attempt, and worth passing along to young people who are intrigued by Miller’s style. It is an entertaining and informative read, raises a number of interesting questions, and is a fascinating exposition of the Gospel through a very different lens.

Check out this funny and frightening and challenging article By Dale Ahlquist:

“In 1918, Chesterton wrote a series of articles called “The Superstition of Divorce” for the New Witness. The essays were published as a collection under the same title in 1920. He said it wasn’t supposed to be a book, but a pamphlet, and the object of a pamphlet is to be out of date as soon as possible. “It can only survive when it does not succeed.”

Unfortunately, it survived. Chesterton’s warnings about the rise of divorce have gone unheeded, warnings best summed up in his prophetic line: “The obvious effect of frivolous divorce will be frivolous marriage. If people can be separated for no reason they will feel it all the easier to be united for no reason.”

But the modern world has begun to portray divorce as a freedom. This comes as no surprise to Chesterton. The modern world, he says, specializes in two forms of freedom: suicide and divorce. “In a dreary time we listen to two counsels of despair: the freedom from life and the freedom from love.” In our society, he says, where every real freedom has been curtailed, the two doors of death and divorce stand open. But just as we should not accept a system that drives men to drown and shoot themselves, we should not accept a system that produces so many divorces. He insists that we admit that divorce is a failure and that it would be much better for us to find the cause and cure rather than allow divorce to complete its destructive effect.”

Read the whole thing here.

For most Christians in most places at most times, believers have desired (and been able) to distinguish between orthodox/faithful members of the Church and heterodox/faithless (seeming) members. The criteria may change, or may be much debated, but the commonest assumption is that it is possible and beneficial, and perhaps necessary, to distinguish religious truth from religious falsehood, and therefore true teachers from false teachers, and therefore true Christianity from heretical perversions thereof.

Walter Bauer argues otherwise.”In earliest Christianity, orthodoxy and heresy do not stand in relation to one another as primary to secondary, but in many regions heresy is the original manifestation of Christianity.” (G. Strecker in introduction to ET of Bauer, xi)

“It is essential to bear in mind that one cannot meaningfully speak of ‘Christianity’ or ‘the church’ as a monolithic entity in the early centuries of its existence. Not only the study of the New Testament, but the history of early post-apostolic Christianity abundantly affirms the essential diversity of forms of Christianity… [O]rthodoxy is not the presupposition of the early church but the result of a process of growth and development.” (George W. Macraw, “Why the Church Rejected Gnosticism,” London: SCM, 1980, p.127, citing Baeur’s Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Earliest Christianity and James M. Robinson and Helmut Koester, Trajectories through Early Christianities)
To establish this thesis, Bauer, Koester and other modern scholars draw historical evidence to show that many divergent — what today Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox or many Protestant theologians would label heretical — forms of Christianity existed earlier than orthodox forms, or existed and were tolerated until later, or existed and later evolved into orthodox forms.Bauer et al must also seek to deconstruct and/or relativize the apparently dogmatic internal unity presupposed by early Christian writers such as Paul, John, James, Eusebius, Polycarp, and Ignatius of Antioch. They marshal historical evidence that the seemingly clear-cut self-definition in these men is not fitting to the actual situation of Christianity.

This historical evidence consists of showing that argument and disagreement existed amongst Christian communities from the earliest times and showing credal variety.

Nor does the first-century apostolic writing simplify things, “because the majority of [the New Testament’s] anti-heretical writings cannot be arranged with confidence either chronologically or geographically. (Bauer, 5) In other words, Paul is (rather often) writing his epistles to established churches to warn and defend them against false teachers, which seems to support that divergent forms existed, were accepted, and were even popular.

Bauer’s thesis is a challenge especially for Protestant theologians and biblical scholars, for whom the primary (if not the only) way to define orthodoxy is to appeal to the New Testament, which itself is a document not formally organized until later (3rd? 4th?) centuries. Perhaps a Roman or Eastern Christian would have alternate strategies. But in the early church such appeals to the NT was simply impossible. (Perhaps it was possible to appeal to this or that particular epistle, but not a “book” or a sum collection of teachings…)Is the thesis true, then, that Christian orthodoxy as defined by modern-day Christian communions was a late development? Maybe. If so, Bauer makes no progress in establishing its truth.

Bauer makes three fatal assumptions: (more…)

We do not value friendship in large part because we do not understand what a “friend” is.

Consider Facebook, which is now the barometer of our relational lives. A “friend” is constituted by someone who you know. And while everyone gets that there is something deeper about actual friendships, the inability to identify that something deeper has emptied “friend” of any meaningful content.

It hasn’t always been this way. There is an apocraphyal story of C.S. Lewis floating around that illustrates the point. A professor whom he had known for several years turned to him one day and asked him if he thought it was finally appropriate for them to use their first names in addressing each other. Lewis rebuffed him, remarking that their relationship was “strictly academic.”

It’s an extreme case, yes, and quite possibly untrue. But it highlights the distinctions between types of relationships that previous generations made. Coworkers were not friends and friends were not family. While this sort of clarity may have been problematic in its own right, it at least allowed each party to be clear on where they stood in the relational universe.

Now, however, that has changed. The formality, the careful distinctions, the idea of social roles has all gone away. And in their place, confusion reigns.

This is particularly true of relationships between men and women. Men have always been friendly–or better, courteous–to women, but they have not necessarily been friends. The difference between male and female and the potential for sexual interaction (a potential which only the very young or the very old may ignore without danger) was too great to permit close interaction outside strictly romantic (or in more base form, strictly sexual) contexts.

The question, then, is whether friendship–whatever that is–is the sort of relationship that men and women can engage in responsibly.

My provisional answer, which is driven largely by my experience, is that any young people seeking to find a spouse would do better (oddly) to cultivate friendships with their same sex while viewing the opposite sex through a strictly romantic lense. Keeping the roles and relationships separate allows us to have more clarity on our own feelings and behaviors in each relationship. I have seen many a person (guy and girl!) unwittingly become emotionally tied to someone who was “just a friend,” only to be heartbroken when they pursued someone else.

Men and women seeking to marry should not deny the role that sexuality plays in their interaction with the opposite sex. To do so is ultimately to fall prey to a gnosticism–that is, a denial of the body–which ironically leads to a weakened ability to control the impulses of the body. Is there any wonder why affairs often start between people who claim to be “just friends?”

One of the more popular arguments against the legalization of homosexual marriage is that it will open the door to polygamous marriages, cross-species marriages, incestuous marriages, etc.  The argument is often dismissed as a “slippery slope” that is unjustified.

I have argued in the past that properly construed, the argument isn’t a “slippery slope” argument at all.  That is, society may in fact never legalize polygamous marriages.  However, the society that acknowledges homosexual marriage will have no principle to fall back on to prevent polygamous marriages.  Hadley Arkes, in his excellent essay “The Family and the Laws,” makes the same point:

We’ve also learned over the ages that the law teaches:  If the law becomes open to the arrangements of mothers and sons, fathers and sons, marrying, we can expect that these arrangements will not stay rare and bizarre–that we will come to see far more of them.  But whether we see more or less, the people who claim rights of same-sex marriage have to deal with this critical problem of their argument:  that they have no ground in principle to deny any longer any of these other arrangements.  They cannot explain why marriage should be confined to a couple, rather than the ensemble of three or four or more who claim to be intimate and loving.  Some of us made this argument eight years ago during the hearings over the Defense of Marriage Act.  And sure enough, as though sprung from the argument itself, we have now seent he advent of the “polyamorous,” the people who claim a right to be joined in marriage to the fuller range of people they are capable of loving.  But if the notion of marriage comes to encompass the polyamorous or the polygamous, or the father and son, or the two brothers, the notion of marriage will have lost its coherence.  And along with that coherence, it will have lost the most compelling ground of its explanation and defense, as something desirable, something we are justified in preserving.

If “marriage” is constituted by intimacy, regardless of the possibility of procreation, then there is no possible grounds on which any intimate relation could be barred from marriage.  As Arkes goes on to point out, an erotic attachment wouldn’t even need be necessary:  two sisters taking care of an elderly father might want to marry in order to take advantage of special provisions for insurance, joint tax returns, etc.
The question of homosexual marriage is not a question of who we should allow into the institution of matrimony.  It is a question of whether marriage should exist as a meaningful idea at all, or whether we wish to remove the principle that undergirds it, a principle that demands the monogamous union of a man and a woman.

In a recent comment, the formidable Mr. Falk said, “The noteworthy thing about the universe is that everything appears to be explainable by immutable laws. As Einstein said, ‘the miracle is that there are no miracles’”

Everything indeed appears to be explainable by immutable laws… Except for people. Psychology, that blessed pseudo-science, and sociology, its ugly step-sister, sometimes have very interesting and even surprisingly explanatory hypotheses, but nothing as of yet near the level of “immutable laws.” Nor is there much hope of finding them via experimental research.
The “laws of human thought and behavior” insofar as they are put forth, are anything but empirical (much though they would like to be!) Insofar as they exist in any universal and agreed-upon form, are they not more intuitive, observational, introspective, and well… psychological?(I know, I know, you’ll say “Neuroscience is still young and developing.” Well, in the meantime, then, we have a lot of certain knowledge about science, and a lot of certain ignorance about scientists…. Unless of course we begrudingly step outside the monarchical realm of ‘immutable laws’ and start talking about relationships, persons, goals, virtues, values, happiness, and the deep demanding desire for knowledge. These are no less real than quarks and supernovas, but are much more mysterious.)

This is a glaring gap in the knowledge acquired by empirical scientific methods. Evolutionists have lots to say about lower life forms. Do they have anything authoritative to say about evolutionists?

The blogosphere has been abuzz with reactions to Vanity Fair’s picture of a provocatively posed Miley Cyrus. Cyrus, the star of Disney’s Hannah Montana and generally lauded for her performance in her role a role model for young girls, has now apparently started the transition toward Britney’s status.

At least that’s one interpretation of the provocative photo. Douthat thinks she’s gaming the machine, which is charitable, but (I think) improbable.

Poulous is typically insightful on this issue:

There’s another problem: Miley Cyrus is not particularly gorgeous. I mean, she’s a nice-looking girl, but the country and the world is teeming with girls that look that nice too. Public beauty as we’ve constructed it has less and less to do with the actual physical beauty of ‘prime specimens’ than it does with the social-status trappings of appeal and the arts and sciences of beautification. The innocence factor can’t but plummet under conditions like these, because the beauty that makes Miley’s picture possible and that makes this commentary possible is manufactured; yes, she herself has something to do with it, but hardly all and probably not most. So what we are worshipping turns out to be less Miss Cyrus’ marvelous fresh fecundity and youthful radiance and more the erotic appeal of a giant confection. In an earlier era, this picture would in fact be a painting of a nameless young girl, and it would be a work of art. In this era, it’s a brick in a long, high wall.

The idea that the model in such a photo would have remained nameless in previous generations is interesting. As an audience, we are no longer confronted by artists attempting to demonstrate the beauty of a nameless model or the female form. Rather, we are confronted by that person, with whom we–through the magnifying effect of modern media–have some familiarity. The collision between Miley Cyrus’ public persona and our personal lives is the fuel upon which the media machine runs, and the fuel which stokes the fires of outrage.

Ultimately, that transmission between media stars and their fans is erotic in nature, though not necessarily sexual (at the beginning). Miley Cyrus, to her male fans, is a person with whom (they imagine) they can identify and relate. She is the proverbial “girl next door” that once upon a time young boys would dream of meeting and marrying. Such stars attain cult-figure status because of the identification fans make with them–there is a sense in which the star is “ours.” Hence the inevitable copy-cat status by real girls in the world, who have to attain the near-impossible standard of looks, personality, and money that Cyrus attains.

This identification makes the transition to sexual icon by such stars more exciting for their fans. In the case of the wholesome children who make the leap, their sexuality experience is set within a broader (albeit still fabricated) context, which more closely approximates how the sexual experience should operate and hence is more erotic. It is at the beginning, anyway. When that broader context falls away and only the sexual persona remains, intrigue dies and the star is inevitably forced to do more and more outlandish things to retain fewer and fewer fans. This was Britney’s journey (though there were others before her) and will be Cyrus’ if she continues down the path.

Of course, what this means is that it is not only fans who identify themselves with stars. When the machine takes hold, stars inevitably judge themselves upon their reception by the audience, which is why insecure young women who experience puberty almost inevitably move toward exposing themselves sexually. In doing so, they experience the validation of their whole person–including their sexuality–they so desperately long for.

Ultimately, however, the machine depends (and this is Poulous’ point) upon the creation of persona’s, then inevitably proceeds to their destruction. It is a mark of unrestrained eros, which devours and consumes those who pursue it. The machine builds the mystery, unveils it, then repeats the process upon its next victim.

It has always been an interest of mine to compare the eye-catching slogans and headlines of major newspapers to the content of the articles that follow. Quite often the blaring headline and opening paragraph can be bold and chilling enough to send shivers up the spine of even the most brave-hearted of men, while the ensuing article progressively weakens its statements until what seemed so terrifying is finally reduced to manageable and realistic phrases that calm the initial shock. I can’t help but wonder if this practice is employed largely for the marketing benefits, rather than for the lofty pursuit of public knowledge and the free proclamation of truth.

Cynicism aside, all the major news wires were abuzz with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ comments to students at the Air Force’s premier school, the Air War College in Maxwell, AL. Headlines blared such shocking statements as, “Air Force Lagging in War Efforts”, “Air Force Under Fire from Defense Secretary”, and “Pentagon Chief Rips Air Force Over War”.

After my staunch military heart ceased to pound over such shocking news (I bleed Air Force blue, after all) I found that the follow up articles were less than compelling and lacked the material needed to substantiate such heart-stopping claims. You can read Gates’ entire speech and decide for yourself if the headlines (and the ensuing mediocre articles) were justified.

It seems as though major news sources just can’t get enough fodder to raise doubt over the American war efforts, this time using a well-reasoned and thoughtful address to American military professionals to raise concerns that our military suffers from irreparable internecine strife—strife that justifies certain doom-and-gloom reports on the futility–and audacity, to borrow contemporary rhetoric—of hope in the American war effort.

Be that as it may, a truly interesting fact was revealed in the official military response to the disparaging headlines. In line with current attempts at military efficiency every Airman received an e-mail response from the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff to both Gates’ speech and its characterization by the major news outlets. They were at pains to assure Air Force members they weren’t really being criticized by the Sec Def. An excerpt reads: (more…)

Spending ten hours a week in discussion with high school students presents some universal truths about human nature. One such universal truth is that human beings do not like to change (even for the better), and so require some strong motivation before they budge. By strong motivation, of course, I mean the pain of not changing outweighs the pain of changing, like a frog whose pot of water has got just two degrees too hot.

This confirms an observation (I believe it was TS Eliot) that human life tends to alternate between “fruitless conversation and thoughtless action.” We do, but do not reflect on what we have done, and do not plan what we will do tomorro; we think about things, but generally avoid thinking about matters in which we might have to reform our daily behavior or long-term goals. Thus we remain in our comfortable (but not that comfortable) little bubble-boy zone of intellectual and pragmatic stagnation.
One great way out of this dilemma (another universal truth one discovers in class with high schoolers) is to find yourself in an even more uncomfortable dilemma; this time a formal logical dilemma, of the kind so heuristically effective in Plato’s writings.
I would like to pose just such an uncomfortable dilemma to you, gracious Mere-O Reader, which has convicted me recently, in hopes that you can either break it down for me (thus relieving me from the bothersome task of doing something about it) or else be convicted yourself, so that I will have company.

(more…)